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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut operated a
birth control clinic where physicians examined married women,
gave them advice on means of preventing conception, and pre-
scribed devices for that purpose. The clinic was closed by state
authorities, and the executive director and the medical director
of the League were convicted of aiding and abetting' patients
in violating a Connecticut statute proscribing the use of con-
traceptives 2 by any person. The trial court rejected the defense
that application of the birth control statute to prohibit the use
of contraceptives by married persons in licit sexual relations
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of
the United States Constitution. The Connecticut Court of Errors
affirmed the judgment.3 On appeal, the Supreme Court of the
United States reversed. Held, a state statute which prohibits
the use of contraceptives by any person unconstitutionally in-
trudes upon the right to privacy in marital relations protected
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Although no article or amendment of the Constitution ex-
pressly guarantees a right to privacy, an early line of cases
giving a liberal interpretation to the fourth and fifth amend-
ments recognized such a right. Chief among these cases is Boyd
v. United States,4 where the Supreme Court held that a federal
statute requiring the defendant to produce his private papers
in a quasi-criminal proceeding violated the fourth amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures and the
fifth amendment's prohibition against forcing a person to tes-
tify against himself. Mr. Justice Bradley, delivering the Court's
administrative regulations established procedure within the service for excusing
from combatant duty all whose consciences, whether or not religiously impelled,
forbade participation. See Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 COLUM. U.Q.
253 (1953) ; Exec. Order No. 2823, March 20, 1918; and War Dep't Gen. Order
No. 28, June 1, 1918. Perhaps in the final analysis this would be the realistic
answer today. Nevertheless, such a solution would run counter to the con-
gressional policy of discretion in the local, civilian boards and might burden the
military with an extensive administrative problem.
1. CONN. GEN. STAT. 54:196 (1958): "Any person who assists, abets, coun-
sels, causes, hires, or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted
and punished as if he were the principal offender."
2. Id. 53:32: "Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instru-
ment for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty
dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both
fined and imprisoned."
3. 151 Conn. 544, 200 A.2d 479 (1964).
4. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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opinion, looked beyond the wording of these amendments to their
underlying principle of protecting "the sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life."5
Later cases protecting the privacy of the individual against
novel forms of "unreasonable searches and seizures" relied
heavily upon Boyd and upon dictum in Ex parte Jackson6 that
the fourth amendment protected a sealed letter in the mail
against being opened without a warrant.7 The Supreme Court's
position was that use in evidence of a self-incriminating state-
ment or document violated the fifth amendment when the state-
ment or document had been obtained by a violation of the fourth
amendment.8 Despite Justice Bradley's broad language in Boyd,
these later cases protected the right to privacy only in situa-
tions where the government had committed what might be
liberally construed as an unreasonable search and seizure.
The passage of prohibition greatly increased the federal gov-
ernment's role in law enforcement. Violators of the ban on
liquor invoked the right to privacy secured by the fourth and
fifth amendments to hamper its enforcement. In Olmstead v.
United States9 the government had obtained evidence of a vio-
lation of prohibition by wiretapping. The defendant asserted
that admission of such evidence violated the fourth and fifth
amendments, but the Supreme Court ruled to the contrary. The
Court reasoned that there could not be a violation of the fifth
amendment in this situaiton without a violation of the fourth.
Thus the question presented was whether wiretapping constitut-
ed an unreasonable search and seizure. The Court applied the
principle of Carroll v. United States1° that the fourth amendment
must be "construed in the light of what was deemed an unrea-
sonable search and seizure when it was adopted" and held that
wiretapping was not proscribed by the fourth amendment. Jus-
tice Brandeis, adhering to the traditional broad view of the
fourth amendment, dissented vigorously from this narrow con-
struction: "[E]very unjustifiable intrusion by the Government
5. Id. at 630.
6. 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878).
7. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Amos v. United States,
255 U.S. 313 (1921) ; Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) ; Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) ; Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914).
8. See note 7 supra.
9. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
10. 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
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upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means em-
ployed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.""
Although Olmstead halted the development of the right to
privacy, it did not overrule earlier cases recognizing such a con-
stitutional right. Moreover, the Court continued to invoke the
right to privacy. In Wolf v. Colorado the Court held that "the
security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police," "the core of the Fourth Amendment," was "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.' 1 2 Thus the right was enforce-
able against the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Nevertheless, evidence obtained by violating this right was not
held by the Supreme Court to be inadmissible in the state courts,
as in federal courts, until Mapp v. Ohio, where the Court held
that evidence obtained by violating the "Fourth Amendment's
right of privacy" was inadmissible in state courts.13
In view of the narrow interpretation of the fourth amend-
ment in Olmstead either the repudiation of that case or the dis-
covery of a constitutional basis for the right to privacy other
than the fourth amendment was necessary before the right could
evolve further. In On Lee v. United States, Justice Douglas
called for a repudiation of Olmstead and a return to the practice
of liberally construing the fourth amendment.1 4 This approach,
however, failed to win the adherence of a majority of the Court,
and Douglas was left with the alternative of finding some con-
stitutional basis for the right to privacy other than the fourth
amendment. But he could not look beyond the first eight amend-
ments and remain an orthodox incorporationist. 15
The birth control statute involved in the instant case had
been previously challenged in Poe v. Ullman ;' however, the case
was dismissed on the ground that the challengers lacked stand-
11. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
12. 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). See also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937).
13. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). Such evidence had been inadmissible in federal
courts since Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
14. 343 U.S. 747, 763 (1952). Previously in Goldman v. United States, 316
U.S. 129 (1941), Justice Douglas had supported Olmstead. In On Lee he specifi-
cally repudiates his prior stand.
15. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 90-92 (1946), where Justice
Black, joined by Justice Douglas, dissented, offering the view that the fourteenth
amendment incorporates all of the first eight amendments as a substitute for a
natural law interpretation of the due process clause. Implicit in this opinion is
the view that the due process clause protects only those rights enumerated in the
Bill of Rights.
16. 367 U.S. 451 (1961).
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ing to sue. In his dissenting opinion in Poe Justice Douglas stated
that though he believed the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment incorporated all of the first eight amend-
ments, he did not think it was "restricted" or "confined" to
them. The right to privacy, he asserted, "emanates from the
totality of the constitutional scheme under which we live."'i7
Thus, Douglas seemingly rejected the incorporationist view that
the fourteenth amendment protects only those liberties guar-
anteed by the first eight amendments.
The instant case broadens both the right to privacy and the
constitutional basis of this right. Seven members of the ma-
jority hold that the Connecticut birth control statute violates the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; however, they
arrive at this common conclusion by four different approaches.
Although Justice White voted with the majority he, unlike
the other six Justices who voted to overturn the conviction,
does not assert that the statute in question violates a constitu-
tional right to privacy. White views the classification of the
right invaded as unimportant. He asserts that the Connecti-
cut statute would be valid, despite its intrusion upon marital
privacy, "if reasonably necessary for the effectuation of a
legitimate and substantial state interest.' 8 However, the only
alleged end of the statute is to discourage illicit sexual rela-
tions. Since a narrower statute could be drawn prohibiting
the use of contraceptives in illicit sexual relations only, the
Connecticut birth control statute deprives married persons of
liberty without due process of law by being broader than neces-
sary to effect its alleged purpose.
Justice Harlan does not speak of a right to privacy in his
opinion but merely states that he considers the Connecticut
statute unconstitutional for the reasons discussed in his dissent-
ing opinion in Poe v. Ullman, where he did assert that the
statute violated the right to privacy. In Poe Justice Harlan took
the position that the right to privacy is part of the liberty pro-
tected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Harlan cites Wolf v. Colorado in support of his position that
the right to privacy is protected by both the fourth and the
fourteenth amendments, but that the fourteenth does not in-
corporate the fourth. Harlan uses Boyd v. United States and
17. Id. at 521.
18. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 504 (1965).
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other cases liberally interpreting the fourth amendment not as
interpretations of an amendment applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment but as expositions of a right pro-
tected by both. Since the rights of privacy protected by these two
amendments are not necessarily the same, privacy may be pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment against an instrusion that
takes some form other than an unreasonable search and seizure.
Although the Connecticut birth control statute is not an intru-
sion upon the home by a unreasonable search and seizure, it is
an intrusion upon life in that home; and is thus an unconstitu-
tional invasion of the right to privacy. 19
Mr. Justice Douglas, delivering the Court's opinion, develops
a theory to explain the origin of those rights which he considers
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
even though not enumerated in the first eight amendments.
Douglas asserts that the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights
have "penumbras" formed by "emanations" from them, which
create "zones of privacy." For example, the penumbras emanat-
ing from the guarantees of the first amendment contain the peri-
pheral rights of choosing a private school for the education of
one's children,20 and of studying a particular foreign language in
that school.21 Freedom of speech and of the press include "the
right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read .... and
freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach."''
Although freedom of association is not mentioned in the first
amendment, the Supreme Court has held that this freedom is a
peripheral first amendment right, and, furthermore, that pri-
vacy in association is also protected. 23 From the existence of
these peripheral rights Justice Douglas infers that "the First
Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from
governmental intrusion. '24 The third amendment prohibition
against quartering troops in any house in peacetime without the
consent of the owner likewise creates a penumbra wherein pri-
vacy is protected, as do the fourth and fifth amendments. The
birth control statute interferes with the marital relationship,
which lies within the zone of privacy created by all of these
amendments, although the statute does not violate any particular
19. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 550 (1961).
20. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
21. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
22. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
23. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
24. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 474, 483 (1965).
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amendment. Implicit within Douglas' argument is the view that
the zone of privacy, as well as the first eight amendments, is
incorporated and protected by the fourteenth amendment. To
strengthen his position Mr. Justice Douglas quotes the ninth
amendment: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain
rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others re-
tained by the people." This amendment forms the heart of Mr.
Justice Goldberg's opinion.
Prior to the instant case the Supreme Court had not inter-
preted the ninth amendment, 25 yet it is well established that "it
cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is in-
tended to be without effect. '26 Justice Goldberg uses the ninth
amendment as an aid in understanding the concept of constitu-
tional liberty protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
Goldberg refutes the restrictions of the incorporationist theory
by interpreting the ninth amendment as indicating that the
authors of the Constitution believed that the people retained
more rights than those enumerated in the first eight amend-
ments. Although Justice Goldberg accepts the view that the
ninth amendment was originally a restriction on federal power
only, he also maintains that the ninth may now have some
relevance to state action. On the other hand, he does not argue
that the ninth amendment is incorporated by the fourteenth,
nor that the ninth amendment is an independent source of fun-
damental rights not spelled out in the Constitution. The ninth
amendment, according to Goldberg, is merely an indication that
the definition of "liberty," protected by the fifth amendment
against federal action and now by the fourteenth against state
action, should not be restricted to rights enumerated in the Con-
stitution. However, the source of these unenumerated rights is
not the ninth amendment, but "'the traditions and (collective)
conscience of our people'. '27
It is submitted that Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion is essen-
tially sound. In their dissenting opinions Justices Black and
Stewart voice the orthodox incorporationist objection that the
Connecticut statute cannot be held unconstitutional unless it
violates a right specifically enumerated in the Constitution.
25. For references in passing to the ninth amendment see United Power
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94 (1945) ; Tennessee Electric Power Co. v.
TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 143 (1938) ; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 330 (1935).
26. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
27. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965).
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In effect this is saying either that unenumerated rights do not
exist, or that they are unenforceable. This seems to advocate
exactly what the ninth amendments forbids - construing the
enumeration of certain rights in the Constitution to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.
Justice Goldberg could have given the ninth amendment a
broader interpretation, for it is arguable that the ninth amend-
ment was not originally intended to be solely a limitation on
federal power.28 The ninth amendment refers to an enumeration
of rights in the Constitution, not just in the first eight amend-
ments. Madison's original draft of the ninth amendment, stated
that "the exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made
in favor of particular rights, shall not be construed as to dimin-
ish the just importance of other rights retained by the people. ' 29
The Constitution not only protects rights against the federal
government by the first eight amendments, but also rights
against state governments in article I, section 10, of the Con-
stitution, which, according to Chief Justice Marshall, "may be
deemed a bill of rights for the people of each state." 30 If the
ninth amendment refers to the whole Constitution, then it for-
bids construing any enumeration of rights as an exclusive list,
whether these rights be protected against the states or against
the federal government. Thus the ninth amendment can be con-
strued as protecting and sanctioning unenumerated rights
against both the federal and state governments, independently
of the fourteenth amendment.
Had the broader view of the ninth amendment been adopted,
the jurisprudence of the fourteenth amendment would have been
irrelevant in considering whether any given right was protected
by the ninth amendment. Almost any claimed right that the
Court had previously determined was not protected by the four-
teenth amendment could be advanced again as an unenumerated
right protected by the ninth amendment, and the issue decided
de novo. Justice Goldberg's approach avoids the danger of ren-
dering irrelevant nearly a hundred years of decisions under the
fourteenth amendment.
Justice's Douglas' opinion is less forceful than Goldberg's,
because Douglas has difficulty reconciling the right to privacy
28. PATTERSON, THE FORoOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 2 (1955).
29. Id. at 16.
30. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810).
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with his incorporationist views. He appears to be attempting
a return to the incorporationist fold, from which he departed in
Poe, by once again restricting his consideration of constitutional
issues to the first eight amendments. Douglas notes that each
amendment of the Bill of Rights guarantees one or more general
rights. In deciding cases the Supreme Court has determined cer-
tain specific rights to be included within these guaranteed gen-
eral rights. For example, the general right, freedom of the
press, includes the specific right to distribute. Douglas also
notes the specific rights which have been recognized as included
within the general rights protected by the first eight amend-
ments. He asserts that these specific rights are but part of a
broader general "right to privacy." The specific right to marital
privacy is also a part of that general right; hence, he concludes,
it is a protected right. This inference, unfortunately, is invalid.
The specific right to distribute is protected because general
freedom of the press is guaranteed expressly by the Constitution.
However, the general "right to privacy" is not similarly guar-
anteed.
Despite the questionable reasoning in Justice Douglas' opin-
ion, it is significant when joined by Justice Golberg's opinion.
Together they indicate that the solution to the incorporationist
controversy may be one of synthesis. Even if the incorporation-
ists do eventually persuade the Court to hold that the fourteenth
amendment incorporates all of the first eight amendments, it
appears very unlikely that the fourteenth amendment will be so
restricted as to protect only the rights guaranteed by the first
eight amendments.
However it is to Justice White's opinion, the narrowest of
the majority's four opinions, that the Court must look if it is to
declare void any other state statute against birth control, for
the Connecticut statute is unique. It is the only state statute
prohibiting the use of contraceptives. Other states have laws
making the sale of contraceptives illegal, but it is difficult to
see how these laws interfere with the right to privacy. It would
consequently appear that if a law forbidding the sale of con-
traceptives is challenged, the Supreme Court will have to adopt
reasoning similar to Justice White's in order to declare it un-
constitutional.
W. Thomas TMte
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